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Thompson and Wilson: Book Review

BOOK REVIEWS
Kamari Maxine Clarke, Fictions
of Justice: The International
Criminal Court and the
Challenge of Legal Pluralism in
Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge
University Press 2009)
Over the past two decades, the response
to violence in sub-Saharan Africa has been
to hold the perpetrators accountable in
international or internationalized tribunals.
Indicative of this phenomenon is that all
four of the situations that the Office of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is currently investigating
involve armed conflict situations in states
in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the ICC
Prosecutor’s recent application to the ICC
to initiate an investigation into a fifth
situation concerns crimes committed in the
course of post-election unrest in Kenya.
The overwhelming attention that the ICC
has given to situations in sub-Saharan
Africa makes Kamari Maxine Clarke’s
book Fictions of Justice1 a timely exposé
on why Africa has seemingly become the
experimental ground for the new system of
international justice and what difficulties
lie in the attempt to achieve legal pluralism
on the continent.
In Fictions of Justice, Clarke challenges
conventionally accepted Western notions
of the victim, perpetrator, and appropriate justice mechanisms for sub-Saharan
Africa. Part I of Clarke’s book uses case
studies from the International Criminal
Court’s case against Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo and traditional justice practices in
Northern Uganda to illustrate an example
of and challenge to liberalist notions of justice. Part II uses several case studies from
the Islamic Sharia penal system in Nigeria
to illustrate that strict Islamic legal norms
have re-emerged that do not neatly fit the
international criminal law mold. Clarke
theorizes that international jurists, NGOs,
and donors have worked together to construct specific concepts of the African victim and perpetrator that further the ICC’s
command responsibility-centered approach
to justice and hinder legal pluralism in
Islamic societies.

Clarke suggests that these international
actors can more easily justify their involvement in the affairs of African states if their
efforts are in the name of universalism
and directed at punishing “barbaric Muslims” in Nigeria or warlords in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) who force
“child soldiers” to commit heinous crimes.
Clarke’s theory points out the inability or
unwillingness of those who champion the
international legal and human rights regime
to address the root causes and dynamics of
violence in sub-Saharan Africa. Among
the issues undergirding the violence are:
the reasons, apart from abduction, why
children become involved in conflicts; the
way that access to resources and spheres of
political power often initiate or fuel armed
conflicts on the continent; and the legal and
moral obligation felt by many Muslims to
maintain the integrity of Islam.
By simplifying the perpetrator of “African violence” to an adult rebel commander
or radical Islam as a whole, the international human rights regime can more easily
reinforce its own premise that Africans are
helpless to mete out justice themselves.
Thus aptly titled, Fictions of Justice highlights the process through which the institutions and NGOs that have mobilized
in the justice-making process attempt to
compartmentalize and manage “African
violence” on behalf of African states.
At first glance, Clarke’s theory appears
flawed because the ICC Prosecutor’s cases
concerning the situations in northern
Uganda, the DRC, and the Central African
Republic came about because the states
themselves referred the situations to the
ICC Prosecutor for investigation. However,
Clarke carefully explains how the global
NGO movement creates epistemic communities of local civil society actors who
proliferate liberalist human rights language
and advocate for international criminal
justice.
By utilizing case studies from Uganda
and Nigeria, Fictions of Justice shrewdly
illustrates the danger of having those who
are removed from the affected community
monopolize justice processes that do not
take into account the affected commu69

nity’s own conceptions of justice. In the
Acholi sub-region of Northern Uganda, for
example, emphasis is placed on restorative
justice than on retributive justice. Clarke
asserts that traditional justice and clan
reconciliation practices in Acholi challenge
the international criminal law structure
because they give the victim a voice and
direct participation as a political being in
the justice process. Therefore, proponents
of international justice would even be
skeptical of traditional justice operating
alongside the ICC proceedings. Clarke
emphasizes that, by simplifying the African victim to an apolitical figure who is
only concerned with basic survival needs
and confining victims’ participation to that
which is done through a representative,
the ICC creates the “ghost victim.”2 The
victims’ plight and evidence of the crimes
themselves become overshadowed by a
quest to prove the command responsibility
of a single individual.
Clarke analyzes the Amina Lawal case
in Nigeria to demonstrate how international NGOs galvanized global support for
their campaign against what they incorrectly and often prejudicially characterized
as the imminent death by stoning of a
woman in a barbaric and ancient Islamic
law system in Nigeria. Considering that
Western audiences view stoning through
Judeo-Christian biblical imagery, the
Amina Lawal case study vividly illustrates
how international NGOs have the potential
to hyperbolize injustice in Africa. In other
words, they can further their own advocacy
agendas by feeding into pre-existing ideas
about justice and misconceptions of nonWestern, non-adversarial proceedings.
Fictions of Justice poses relevant questions about who determines that a certain
type of violence is “just” while others
deserve punishment. Her criticism is not
aimed merely at international actors, but
also at domestic actors who use religion or
appeals to traditional justice to oppose liberalist or international influence. Although
Clarke adopts Nigerian human rights lawyer Hauwa Ibrahim’s position that legal
reform is needed in both the Islamic and
secular spheres in Nigeria, Clarke fails to
detail exactly how those reforms would
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take shape. Particularly when reformers
would be working with the same international institutions that have dictated the
“justice” vernacular up to this point, why
would donors not also dictate the education of judges, court officials, and police
officers, or advocate a Westernized reform
of the Sharia Penal Code?
As donor funding moves increasingly
from directly supporting states to funding
African NGOs, Fictions of Justice calls for
domestic and international actors to look
beyond merely “sensitizing” local communities to support justice mechanisms
that assign criminal responsibility based
on liberalist human rights notions, and
instead empower local populations to participate in the political processes that shape
international criminal legal institutions and
non-secular legal institutions.
Eleanor Thompson, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, reviewed Fictions of Justice for the Human Rights
Brief. Prior to law school, Thompson
worked with war-affected communities in
northern Uganda and with the Coalition
for the International Criminal Court on
international justice campaigns in subSaharan Africa.

is “intimately connected with ideas of
sovereignty.”5

States of Violence: War, Capital
Punishment, and Letting Die
(Austin Sarat & Jennifer
L. Culbert eds., Cambridge
University Press 2009)
In States of Violence: War, Capital Punishment, and Letting Die,3 Austin Sarat and
Jennifer L. Culbert present scholarship on
three areas of state violence: war, capital
punishment, and the act of letting die.
Their exploration rests on a fundamental
philosophical analysis of the functioning
and purpose of the state’s use or threat of
violence. Sarat and Culbert’s thesis is that,
because the state is by necessity inherently
violent, its violent acts may not be so easily challenged as many critics suspect. Put
another way, a state must threaten its citizens with actual or implied force in order
to exist. Because the state is by nature
violent, determining when it has abused
its license is often more complicated than
simply identifying violence.
To do this, Sarat and Culbert establish
violence as inherent to the existence of
the state through a deeply philosophical
discussion of social contract theory. They
rely most notably on Thomas Hobbes to
explain the state’s need to keep “all in
awe.”4 In The Leviathan, Hobbes contrasts
the “state of nature” — complete freedom
and condition of war — with the creation
of the state, requiring individuals to sacrifice certain freedoms in the name of
greater security. The source of that security
is the overwhelming power of the state to
destroy any who challenge its rules. Thus,
Sarat and Culbert conclude that violence
70

By bringing together essays on the
diverse forms of state violence, Sarat and
Culbert complicate the concept of state
violence and include within it actions that
appear justified or even nonviolent. From
the Iraq War to capital punishment and the
abrogation of indigenous rights, each of the
eleven essays in States of Violence presents
an example of state violence connected
with seemingly non-violent state action.
The essays then explore how the state’s
violence is couched in nonviolent action
or justified as the prevention of greater
violence: the Iraq War was billed as a “preemptive strike” in the name of defense;
capital punishment is justified as crime
prevention; and the destruction of indigenous identity is often the result of treaties
alleging to create indigenous rights.
While each of the essays carefully presents the acts of violence and the victims
themselves as textured and nuanced, the
state is often portrayed as a homogenous,
one-dimensional entity with little complexity. This imbalance makes it difficult to
apply the concept of the inherently violent
state to the real world. Such a philosophical
concept may be difficult to use directly as
a foundation for any criticism of state violence. Nevertheless, it may still inform the
discourse on the proper limits of state violence. It seems likely that this is the project
that Sarat and Culbert mean to undertake,
because at no point does the book suggest
that the inherently violent state should be
free from critique.
The essays in States of Violence are
divided into two sections. The first section,
entitled “On the Forms of State Killing,”
explores the various ways that state violence manifests itself throughout the world,
and the second, “Investigating the Discourse of Death,” looks specifically at capital punishment as a form of state violence.
The following synopses highlight several
different forms of state violence addressed
in the book and provide a glimpse of the
implications of Sarat and Culbert’s thesis
in action.
The first section begins with an essay
by Robin Wagner-Pacifici entitled “The
Innocuousness of State Lethality in an
Age of National Security.” Wagner-Pacifici
analyzes “documents of state” and the use
of war as a “variation on a theme of lethality” within the context of the U.S. “War
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on Terror.”6 Through a close examination
of the George W. Bush administration’s
National Security Strategy of the United
States of America for 2002 and 2006, as
well as the 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, Wagner-Pacifici constructs
an image of U.S. foreign policy as an
offensive strategy disguised as a defensive
one. Further, Wagner-Pacifici illustrates
how the rhetoric used in these documents
is specifically crafted to legitimize the use
of force against other nations by describing
it as necessary pre-emptive defense action.
In “Due Process and Lethal Confinement,” Colin Dayan parallels the “legal
death” of detainees caught outside any
clear legal establishment with the absence
of due process for suspected gang members in U.S. prisons. Dayan specifically
examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, and the later
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Boumediene v. Bush. Dylan makes tangible the
tension between the Court’s rulings and the
efforts of the George W. Bush administration to maintain the detainees at Guantanamo and other detention facilities around
the world as stateless and rightless “illegal
enemy combatants.” In poignant contrast,
Dayan explores the lack of due process for
inmates determined to be gang members
when they are placed in solitary confinement in Arizona prisons. Both groups, he
contends, exist in a world where they have
lost their “right to have rights.”7
In the first section’s final piece, Mark
Antaki and Coel Kirby discuss the destructive effects of the Canadian government’s

recognition of indigenous peoples in “The
Lethality of the Canadian State’s (Re)
cognition of Indigenous Peoples.” Kirby
and Antaki argue that the state’s recognition of an indigenous people as a legally
cognizable group is an integral part of the
process that destroys them as a separate
people. Because Canada’s legal recognition of indigenous people has consistently
required their submission to Canadian
authority, the very act of gaining legal
identity is the first step towards losing
indigenous cultural identity. Kirby and
Antaki argue this shows that state violence
need not be physical in form, but that “[b]
y its very sight and speech, the state kills
people as peoples.”8
The second section begins with “Death
in the First Person” by Peter Brooks.
Brooks’s essay explores author Victor
Hugo’s effort to humanize the act of execution by telling it through the eyes of
the condemned in Le Dernier Jour d’un
Condamné. Brooks seeks to demonstrate
the importance of narrative in understanding the death penalty. Rather than focusing
on the moral or ideological underpinnings
of the death penalty, Brooks suggests that
something valuable can be gained by looking at the story of the condemned and of
execution itself.
In the third essay in this section, “Ethical Exception: Capital Punishment in the
Figure of Sovereignty,” Adam Thurschwell
seeks to illuminate the distinction between
moral and political arguments against capital punishment. He argues that the political-philosophical reasoning for the state’s
right to kill its subjects is far more reveal-
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ing of the real basis for the state’s authority
to take life than the moral-philosophical
arguments so often made. In particular,
he notes that anti-abolitionists have effectively argued that, because nearly every
decision that states make involves some
consequence of life or death to its citizens,
capital punishment should not be singled
out for abolition. Thurschwell does not put
forth an argument for or against capital
punishment, but rather aims to find the
“issues that really matter today in the field
of capital punishment . . . .”9 While not
indicating which way this line of reasoning would move the moral-philosophical
debate, Thurschwell makes a compelling
argument for the incorporation of the political-philosophical line of thought.
Through the varied examples of state
violence that it explores, States of Violence
succeeds in making the point that the relationship of the state to violence is less susceptible to critique than first appearance
would suggest. The wide range of essays
support the contention that this is not a limited thesis, but is rather applicable to the
various forms of state violence. Implicit
in this thesis is a challenge to the reader to
incorporate the more informed understanding of state violence into continued critique
of that violence. Perhaps, with the knowledge that the state is inherently violent, one
can more effectively argue for how that
violence can be toned and tempered. HRB
Evan Wilson, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law, reviewed States of
Violence for the Human Rights Brief.

